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 POST PRODUCTION 
EXPENSES-I DON’T CARE 
WHAT THE RULES ARE, 
JUST TELL ME WHAT THEY 
ARE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bob Honea 
Post Production Expenses in Arkansas: 
I Don’t Care What the Rule is, Just Tell me What it is. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The payment of royalties to the lessor in an oil and gas lease is a procedure that may seem 
straightforward on its face: lessor and lessee execute an oil and gas lease, lessee drills and captures 
oil or gas, lessee sells that gas and pays the fractional royalty price to the lessor. On paper it seems 
elementary - in practice it is anything but clear. The only clear-cut rule that every jurisdiction has 
seemed to agree upon is that production expenses are borne by the lessee - the lessor’s royalty is not 
affected by the cost of actual drilling and the related operations. However, the major dispute 
regarding the calculation and payment of royalties is what post production expenses, if any, can 
fairly be deducted from the lessor’s royalty share? Jurisdictions across the country have wrestled 
with this issue, leading to a myriad of approaches and theories underlying the calculation of gas 
royalties. At the risk of oversimplifying the approaches, I have grouped these theories into three 
major sub-groups: (1) at-the-well jurisdictions; (2) first marketable product jurisdictions; and (3) 
statutory scheme jurisdictions. As a caveat, it must be noted that these groups are not internally 
identical; each jurisdiction puts its own twist on the treatment of post production expenses. 
Some jurisdictions use an “at-the-well” approach. It is considered to be the majority 
approach.1 This approach has also been called the “net-back calculation” approach or the 
“property-centered” approach. Regardless of the moniker, the result is as follows: gas in place is real 
property, which is bargained for and exchanged at some rate (bonus plus royalty) via the oil and gas 
lease. Gas which is drilled and brought to the surface (gas that is, literally, “at-the- wellhead”) 
becomes personal property and is therefore subject to royalty calculation at that point. The problem 
is that gas “at-the-wellhead” is worth nothing - without various post-production 
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treatment, transportation, and marketing, the lessor awaiting with his hands out for payment would 
collect 1/8 of zero dollars - hardly an economic incentive to lease away his real property mineral 
interests. Enter the “net-back calculation.” The net-back calculation deducts various 
post-production expenses before calculating the fractional royalty due to the lessor. This allows for 
the lessee to allocate the costs of post-production between itself and the lessor, and it transforms an 
otherwise zero dollar fractional interest into positive dollars for the lessor. 
Other jurisdictions have adopted the “First Marketable Product Doctrine.” This approach 
has been considered a “contract-centered” approach. This doctrine relies heavily on a covenant 
implied in every oil and gas lease by judicial interpretation: the lessee’s implied duty to market. 
Courts have reasoned that, without the imposition of an implied duty to market, lessees may be 
tempted to take only their “share” of the gas in the ground, and direct the lessor to remove its own 
fractional royalty interest “in-kind” (in actual gas) from the reserves still beneath the surface. Again, 
this would be impossible for the average lessor, and would ultimately result in a zero dollar royalty 
payment. The First Marketable Product Doctrine reasons that the lessee, by virtue of its obligations 
under the applicable lease, bears the burden of getting the gas to the point (both location and 
condition) at which the product is truly “marketable.” The various jurisdictions have set this 
threshold at different points, whether in location or condition of the gas, and at least one jurisdiction 
has taken this doctrine to an extreme. 
At least one jurisdiction has attempted to solve the post-production-expenses problem 
legislatively rather than judicially. That state has enacted a statute that purports to protect royalty 
interest holders’ interests and guard against deducting post production expenses that should 
ultimately be borne by the lessee. A closer look at this jurisdiction, however, reveals that 
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the courts once again had to address the issue and the approach is no longer clear-cut even in the face 
of a statute directly on point. 
The myriad of approaches out there should lead you, as an Arkansas practitioner, to ask one 
question: Which approach has Arkansas adopted? Once again, however, the answer is anything but 
clearcut. In fact, a review of the applicable case law and statutes reveal that, at various points in 
time, Arkansas has followed all three approaches. This leads me to conclude that Arkansas has no 
rule at all. Whether it needs one is a different story. 
I. STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 
A. At-the-well States 
1. Texas 
In Texas, the extraction of oil and gas from the ground invokes a property-centered analysis: 
namely, gas in the ground is real property, but when it is extracted it transforms into personal 
property. This rule may seem elementary on its face, but its application to the calculation and 
allocation of post-production expenses is pivotal in Texas. For example, in Martin v. Glass,2 the 
lease at issue contained an “at-the-well”3 provision.” Neither party to the lease argued that it was 
ambiguous. The Court held that compression costs were properly charged against the royalty and 
overriding royalty owners. The Court explained that “royalty is based on the value of all gas 
produced at the mouth of the well.”4 It went on to state that post production costs included those 
costs “necessary to render the gas marketable.”5 The Court also relied upon the lessee’s implied duty 
to market6 as another basis for allocation of post production costs between lessors and lessees. In 
sum, it is the lessee’s duty to market - and this duty arises “at the well.” However, the Court went 
one step further and defined marketing as “a separate and independent step, once or more removed 
from product, and as such is a post-production 
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expense.”7 It must be noted, however, that Texas holds generally that parties are free to modify this 
general rule through specific contract language. 
2. Louisiana 
The proper calculation of post production expenses has been discussed recently in 
Louisiana in the case of Culpepper v. EOG Resources, Inc.8 In Culpepper, the lessors brought suit 
after the lessees deducted transportation costs prior to computing their royalty. The trial court found 
that such deductions were improper and that the lease, which utilized the phrase “computed at the 
mouth of the well,” was ambiguous. The Court of Appeals of Louisiana held that such language 
contemplated deduction of transportation costs from the well to the purchaser prior to calculation of 
royalty payments. The Court explained that its previous ruling in Merritt v. Southwestern Electric 
Power Co.9 was controlling. In Merritt, the Court explicitly held that the common lease language 
“at the mouth of the well” meant that post production costs could be deducted. Merritt dealt with 
compression costs, but Culpepper extended this ruling to include transportation costs as well. 
3. California 
One case out of California is of particular note because it dealt with the State as lessor. One 
would think that if ever there was an argument that post production expenses were not deductible 
prior to royalty calculation, taking money from the State would offer that circumstance. However, 
in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. State,10 the California Court of Appeals found just the opposite. In 
Atlantic Richfield Co., the lessee brought an action against the State seeking a declaratory judgment 
allowing it to deduct processing and transportation costs. The trial court, which was affirmed on 
appeal, relied upon a statute in force at the time of execution of the leases. That statute provided that 
“royalties shall be paid in kind or as a percentage of the 
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current market price at the well of, and of any premium or bonus paid on, the production removed or 
sold from the leased land.”11 The appellate court reasoned that the phrase “at the well,” when used in 
the context of the oil and gas industry, “is commonly understood to mean that the oild and gas is to be 
valued in its unprocessed state as it comes to the surface at the mouth of the well.”12 Based on this 
definition, California has explicitly held that “It is the rule in California that unless there is clear 
language to the contrary, the lessor of an oil and gas lease, such as the State, bears its proportionate 
share of processing costs incurred downstream of the well.”13 Although the State argued that the 
technical phrase “at the well” should be ignored in the statute, the Court refused to parse the 
legislation in such a way. 
4. New Mexico 
New Mexico has recently weighed in on the issue of post production expenses in the case of 
ConocoPhillips Co. v. Lyons.14 In Lyons, the Court held that a “net proceeds” royalty calculation is 
properly computed “at the well.” The Court explained that when the term “at the well” is utilized, the 
point of valuation is the well and the “lessee is entitled to deduct all costs that are incurred subsequent 
to production, including those necessary to transport the gas to a downstream market and those costs, 
such as dehydrating, treating, and processing the gas, that are either necessary to make the gas 
saleable in that market or that increase the value of the gas.”15 
The interesting point brought up by the Lyons case is that the leases in question did not 
provide for sale of the gas “at the well.” Instead, the leases provided for royalty payable upon “net 
proceeds...in the field” or “from the sale of gas from each gas well.” The New Mexico Supreme Court 
was faced with an issue of first impression: when are royalties calculated when the lease provides for 
royalty payable based on language other than “at the well.” The Court 
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focused on the phrase “net proceeds,” and explained that “net proceeds” meant “the amount 
received in a transaction minus the costs of the transaction.”16 The Court looked to course of 
performance, course of dealing, custom in the industry, and a state statute regarding post production 
cost allocation between the State and State lessees in affirming the trial court’s approval of 
deducting post production costs before calculating royalty. 
5. Michigan 
The pivotal case in Michigan is Schroeder v. Terra Energy, Ltd.17 In Schroeder, oil and 
gas lessors sued their lessee after the lessee deducted post production costs from their royalty 
payments. Although Michigan can be placed on the “at the well” side of the royalty spectrum, 
its rationale is strangely more contractually based, rather than property-cneteredcentered like 
Texas. The Schroeder Court explained that: 
In construing an oil and gas lease, this Court is guided by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in J.J. Fagan & Co. v. Burns. In J.J. Fagan, the Court 
noted the widespread use of standard oil and gas lease forms. The Court 
further noted that the language used in those lease forms had evolved 
through the process of trial and error with careful attention being paid to 
judicial decisions interpreting the standard contractual verbiage. An oil and 
gas lease is not an isolated agreement drafted by uninformed neighbors to 
express roughly their agreement but, rather, is a technical contract reflecting 
the development and present status of the law of oil and gas.18 
However, the Court went on to concede that the parties’ intent should ultimately resolve 
issues of ambiguity even in standardized oil and gas lease forms. In fact, the Court admitted that 
ambiguities in oil and gas leases “should be resolved in favor of the lessors as a policy matter.”19 
Despite these caveats, however, the Court held that a return to basic economic theory suggested that 
the phrase “at the wellhead” necessarily meant ascertainable gross proceeds, and that gross proceeds 
from a sale elsewhere must be “extrapolated, backwards or forwards, to reflect 
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appropriate adjustments due to differences in the location, quality, or characteristics of what is being 
sold.” The Court reasoned that this interpretation exceeded the bounds of the oil and gas industry 
and actually applied to sales of other goods as well. Hence, the net-back calculation method was 
explicitly adopted in Michigan. 
6—Mississippi 
NEED A CASE ------ NYGAARD ONLY TALKS ABOUT REAL VS PERSONAL 
PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF CALCULATING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
(Maybe Pursue v. Abernathy?) 
A. First Marketable Product States 
1. Oklahoma 
Oklahoma was perhaps the first state to adopt the “First Marketable Product Doctrine” as 
the guiding principle regarding the allocation of post production expenses. The earliest case 
(CHECK) in which Oklahoma adopted this view was Barton v. Laclede Oil & Mining Co.20 In 
Barton, the Court held that “where there is not a clear expression by parties to the contrary, royalty is 
payable at the point where the gas is first marketable.”21 Further, the point at which gas is “first 
marketable” is ordinarily a question of fact. This necessarily requires a case-by-case analysis with 
regard to post-production costs in Oklahoma. 
Then Iin 1992, an Oklahoma federal court, sitting in diversity, certified the following 
question to the Oklahoma Supreme Court: whether an oil and gas lessee/operator who is obligated to 
pay the lessor 3/16 at the market price at the well for the gas sold is entitled to deduct the cost of gas 
compression from the lessor’s royalty interest. The Supreme Court responded in the negative in 
Wood v. TXO Production Corp.22 In Wood, the Oklahoma Supreme Court explained that Oklahoma 
has held that a lessor must bear its proportionate share of 
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transportation costs where the point of sale was off the leased premises.23 However, it refused to 
extend that obligation to include compression costs in Wood. The Court reasoned that “one of the 
risks borne by the lessee in exploring for gas is that the gas will be low pressure.” Relying once 
again on the well-established implied duty to market, the Wood Court held that because the royalty 
owners had no input with regard to cost-bearing decisions, the Court could not impose on them 
working interest ownership obligations without the attendant rights. The duty to market in 
Oklahoma therefore necessarily includes “obtaining a marketable product,” and that burden is borne 
solely by the lessee. 
2. Colorado 
One of the pre-eminent cases in Colorado dealing with the allocation of post production 
expenses is Rogers v. Westerman Farm Co.24 In Rogers, the applicable leases provided for gas to be 
sold either at the well, at the pipeline, or used “in kind.”25 The leases also provided language for a 
royalty based on an accounting “at the well.” The Colorado Supreme Court held that the “at the 
well” language did not include an allocation of transportation costs to the lessor. The court reasoned 
that the lessee’s implied duty to market included transporation and a passthrough to the lessor would 
be inequitable. The Rogers case reconfirmed the position set forth in an earlier Colorado case known 
as Garman v. Conoco, Inc.26 
In Garman, the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly held that “overriding royalty 
interest owners are not obligated to bear any share of post-production expenses, such as 
compressing, transporting and processing, undertaken to transform raw gas produced at the surface 
into a marketable product.”27 The Court’s rationale was this: before an inexperienced landowner 
could be bound by the meaning of a technical term of art, the landowner must have a “full 
understanding” of the term. Explaining further, the Court held that “royalty” was a 
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technical term, with a precise meaning in the oil and gas industry.” As such, royalties in Colorado 
simply cannot include a “net back calculation” within them. This case essentially adopted the “First 
Marketable Product Doctrine” in the State of Colorado. 
 --- (CHECK: Colorado has not wavered from this position.)28 
3. Kansas 
Kansas adopted a scheme regarding allocation of transportation costs similar to that of 
Oklahoma in Sternberger v. Marathon Oil Co.29 In Sternberger, the Kansas Supreme Court explained 
that the lessee under an oil and gas lease had the implied duty to produce a marketable product and 
that “the lessee alone bears the expense in making the product marketable.” However, the Court went 
on to explain that “once a marketable product is obtained, reasonable costs incurred to transport or 
enhance the value of the marketable gas may be charged against nonworking interest owners. The 
burden to prove the reasonableness of those costs falls on the lessee. However, “[a]bsent a contract 
providing to the contrary, a nonworking interest owner is not obligated to bear any share of 
production expense, such as compressing, transporting, and processing, undertaken to transform gas 
into a marketable product.” In other words, Kansas’s stance on the issue is murky at best. 
The Court in Sternberger also was presented with a conflict of laws issue and undertook an 
examination of Oklahoma and Texas law. With respect to Oklahoma law, tThe Sternberger Court 
explained that Wood merely distinguished Johnson based on the nature of the post production 
expenses (compression versus transportation). The Court held that Oklahoma law tracked with 
Kansas law: “Compression and other expenses necessary to make the product 
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marketable are not deductible, but transportation costs are deductible where the sale occurs off the 
lease premises.” 
The Sternberger Court’s interpretation of Texas law, on the other hand, reveals that Texas 
is a true “at the well” state: “Post-production expenses are borne proportionately by the lessor and 
the lessee, while the lessee alone bears the costs of production.” Thus, the court concluded that 
deductions allowed in Texas deduction are considered to be “broader” than those allowed in 
Kansas. The ultimate result in Sternberger is a Kansas holding allowing for deduction of 
transportation costs, but a remand to determine whether the specific transportation costs in the case 
at bar were reasonable. 
1. West Virginia 
The pre-eminent case on point in West Virginia is Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc.30 In 
Wellman, the leases provided for royalty based on “proceeds” received by the lessee. The Court 
held that this type of “proceeds” lease required royalty to be calculated truly at the well; in other 
words, the lessee would bear all post production costs. Again, the Court reasoned that the lessee’s 
implied duty to market burdened the lessee to fulfill its covenants under the lease out of its own 
pockets. However, at least one scholar has opined that the Wellman case took the “First Marketable 
Product Doctrine” to a new level - “by expanding the duty to market to require a lessee to bear all 
costs to the point of sale and not just to the point where a marketable product is created.”31 The 
West Virginia approach is like a First Marketable Product Doctrine jurisdiction on steroids, with 
total protection for the lessor and total risk borne by the lessee. 
A. Pennsylvania: A Statutory “Solution” that Proved Insufficient 
The gas boom created by the Marcellus Shale Play required Pennsylvania to join in the 
conversation about how to allocate post production expenses, if they are allocated to the lessor at 
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all. Pennsylvania’s answer to this nationwide confusion was statutory in nature. In DATE, Tthe 
Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Guaranteed Minimum Royalty Act (“GMRA”). This 
Act provides: 
A lease or other such agreement conveying the right to remove or recover oil, 
natural gas, or gas of any other designation from lessor to lessee shall not be valid if 
such lease does not guarantee the lessor at least one-eighth royalty of all oil, natural 
gas, or gas of other designations removed or recovered from the subject real 
property.32 
As you can see, Pennsylvania attempted to skirt the “at the well” term-of-art issue that arose with 
XX’s statute. However, the judicial interpretation of this statute instead found a new foothold to 
focus upon: “removed or recovered.” 
In Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., Inc., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether 
the deduction of post production expenses, which resulted in less than a 1/8 royalty going to the 
lessor, violated the GMRA. In Kilmer, the lessee used a net-back calculation method to deduct post 
production expenses. The Court held that although the GMRA set a minimum royalty fractional 
interest in Pennsylvania, the statute was “silent regarding the definition of royalty and the method 
for calculating royalty.” The Court noted that the statute did not contain any of the typical 
industry-standard terms such as “at the wellhead,” “postproduction costs,” or “point of sale.” 
Explaining that in 1979, when the GRMA was adopted, the legislature could have intended 
both parties’ intentions: that royalty be calculated at the wellhead (favorable to the lessee) and that 
royalty be calculated at the point of sale (favorable to the lessor). This splitting- the-baby rationale 
resulted in the Kilmer Court holding that royalty never includes production expenses but it can 
include a deduction for post production expenses, including “production or 
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gathering taxes, costs of treatment of the product to render it marketable, and costs of transportation 
to market.”33 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court grappled with the GMRA again_, and more recently, in 
Katzin v. Central Appalachia Petroleum.34 In Katzin, the lessee argued that the lease at issue was so 
vague as to which post production costs were deductible from his royalty that it was rendered void 
under the GMRA. The Court reasoned that when a contract is silent as to whether it is violative of a 
statute, the parties impliedly assume that the agreement satisfies the statute and that an implied 
promise to do whatever act necessary to carry out the contract exists. Because the lease included a 
1/8 royalty, in line with the statutory language, the Court held that any complaint by the lessee was 
better suited for a breach of contract action than a total invalidation based on a statutory violation. 
III. ARKANSAS: WHAT IS THE RULE? 
At least one scholar has grouped Arkansas in with the minority approach, declaring that it 
falls within the “First Marketable Product” jurisdictions.35 However, it is clear that, in actuality, 
Arkansas has no rule at all. Alternatively, it might be said that Arkansas has no rule because it has, 
in effect, adopted every rule mentioned in this paper. 
A. The Statutes 
_ Although never discussed in a reported decision in the context of post-production 
expenses, Act 222 of 1929 would appear on its face to be at least relevant to the discussion. The 
pertinent language of the Act is as follows: 
“All purchasers of oil and gas shall pay to the royalty interest the same 
premium or bonus above the posted market price for oil or gas they pay to 
the lease holder or working interest under any oil, gas, or mineral lease on 
lands from which oil or gas may be purchased under contract with the lease 
owner or operator. A.C.A. §15-74-703. 
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It shall be unlawful for any purchaser of oil or gas to enter into any contract 
with any lessee or operator under any oil, gas, or mineral lease whereby the 
purchaser undertakes to pay any of the cost or expense of operation or 
production, steaming, treating, or running oil or gas or any other bonus or 
premium under any name or subterfuge whatsoever, without providing for 
paving to the royalty interest its proportionate share according to interests 
therein. A.C.A. §15-74-704. 
It shall be the duty of both the lessee, or his assignee, and any pipeline 
company, corporation, or individual contracting for the purchase of oil or 
gas under any oil, gas, or mineral lease to protect the royalty of the lessor’s 
interest by paying to the lessor or his assignees the same price- including 
premiums, steaming charges, and bonuses of whatsoever name for royalty 
or gas that is paid the operator or lessee under the lease for the working 
interest thereunder. A.C.A. §15-74-705. 
It shall be unlawful for any pipeline Company, Corporation, or individual 
purchasing oil or gas from the operator or lessee of any oil, gas, or mineral 
lease to enter into any contract with the operator or lessee whereby the 
purchaser acquires the royalty oil or gas reserved in the oil, gas, or mineral 
lease for any price less than the price paid the operator or lessee of the lease. 
A.C.A. §15-74-706.” 
 _____ The Act also includes provisions making it a crime (a misdemeanor) to violate the 
provisions of the Act, and further provides for the forfeiture of oil and gas leases and trouble 
damages for violations of the Act. A.C.A. §15-74-701 and 708. 
 _____ Although Arkansas authority with respect to post production expenses is scant, it is 
nevertheless a wonder that these statutes are not discussed in those decisions. Any reasonable 
reading of these statutes would suggest that they are at least relevant to the discussion. 
Nevertheless, at this point in the development of Arkansas law, what you see is what you get - 
these are the, statutes, you tell me what they mean. ______________________________________ 
B. Two Cases Purportedly “On Point” 
In Arkansas, many practitioners and scholars argue that only two cases have dealt with post 
production expenses, and neither has provided a lasting rule for use in future instances.36 In 
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Hanna Oil & Gas Co. v. Taylor,37 the lessee began deducting gas compression costs from the 
lessor’s royalty payments. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the lessee was not entitled to do 
this because the royalty clause contained in the contract was a “proceeds” royalty clause. The Court 
looked to the specific contract language which provided that: “Lessee shall pay Lessor one-eighth 
of the proceeds received by Lessee at the well for all gas (including all substances contained in such 
gas) produced from the leased premises and sold by Lessee.” The Court noted that this was an issue 
of first impression with regard to that particular royalty clause language. 
The Court reasoned that, unless the agreement stated otherwise, “proceeds” are generally 
defined as “total proceeds.” Unlike many of the First Marketable Product jurisdictions, the Court 
did not find the lease language ambiguous. Instead, it explained that proceeds was clear and if the 
lessee had desired to deduct post production costs such as compression costs then it should have 
referenced those costs in the lease or referred instead to “net proceeds.” In dicta, the Court went on 
to say that even if the language was found to be ambiguous the lease language should be construed 
in favor of the lessor. The Court also added course of dealing and course of performance rationale to 
bolster its holding, although such evidence would be improper if no ambiguity existed. Hanna did 
not discuss or mention Act 222 of 1929. 
The other, older, case that is oft-cited is Clear Creek Oil and Gas Co. v. Bushmiaer.38 In 
Clear Creek Oil, the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed whether a fixed rate royalty should be 
subject to deductions for transportation and distributing charges. The lease in question provided 
that royalty would be calculated at the well at the market price. However, testimony in the case 
revealed that no market existed at the well. The Court explained: 
...if there be no market value at the place of delivery, the value of the goods 
or other product should be determined at the nearest place where they have a 
market value, deducting the extra expense of delivering them 
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there. The prices prevailing at the nearest place where the product can be 
sold, less transportation and distributing charges, show the value of such 
product at the place of delivery as nearly as it is possible to show such 
value.39 
The Court remanded the case for a calculation of what royalty was due the lessor. Clear Creek 
seems to align Arkansas with the Texas “at-the-well” approach, but Hanna falls on the opposite 
side of the spectrum. Thus, Arkansas essentially has no rule because it has used both rules. 
CB. The “Real” Cases and Statutes to Look to for a RuleHillard and Hales 
If the statutes, Hanna, and Clear Creek Oil leave a practitioner scratching his head, the 
addition of two more cases may leave him considering a different legal specialty. 
 _____ Hillard v. Stephens40 was primarily a case involving the question of whether a long term 
gas purchase contract effectively established the “market price at the well” for purposes of royalty 
calculations. The court in Hillard held that “as long as the gas purchase contracts were reasonable 
when entered into” the contracts establish the “market price at the well” and that royalties are 
properly paid on the basis of the proceeds paid under the long term gas purchase contract. In 
discussing this topic, the court never mentioned Act 222 of 1929. 
 _____ The court then went on to discuss the impact of Act 222 of 1929 on fixed price leases. 
Some of the leases involved in the Hillard case were fixed price leases, which specified that the 
royalty would be paid on the basis of seven cents ($0.07) per MFC. The lessors argued that this 
language was in direct conflict with Act 222 of 1929, and that the royalty should therefore be 
calculated based on what the lessee actually received under the long term gas purchase contracts. 
The court rejected the argument, and held that Act 222 of 1929 was irrelevant. 
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“If, as the trial court held, [Act 2221 converts all “fixed price” gas leases 
into “proceeds” leases, it follows that fixed price leases favorable to a lessor 
or higher “fixed price” leases would be converted into “proceeds” leases. 
That is not the intent of the statute. Nor is it to prohibit fixed price contracts 
for oil and gas leases.” 
 _____ The foregoing represents the sum total of the court’s analysis of the interplay between 
Act 222 and negotiated contracts (oil and gas leases). Apparently, the court was of the opinion that 
the parties are free to enter into contractual agreements which directly contradict the result 
mandated by Act 222. This seems a little odd, to say the least, particularly in light of the discussion 
of Act 222 in SEECO v. Hales. 
 _____ SEECO v. Hales41 likewise involved royalty owner litigation arising out of a long term 
gas purchase agreement. One of the claims the royalty owners asserted was that they were 
entitled to be paid royalty on take or pay settlements pursuant to long term gas purchase 
contracts. The royalty owners specifically relied on Act 222 in support of their contention. The 
court agreed with the royalty owners, finding that Act 222 did in fact govern. 
“Arkansas has a statute, §15-74-705, that appears to decide this issue. In 
their reply brief, the appellants counter that the statute refers “to premiums 
or bonuses” paid to an operator for royalties on gas that has been produced 
or sold. However, the statute does not specify that the gas has to have been 
produced or sold. It only states that the premiums or bonuses must be paid 
when any money is paid the lessee. It follows that if SEECO had received a 
settlement on the take or pay deficiencies, SEECO would have then been 
obligated to pay “to the lessor or his assignees the same price... for royalty 
oil or gas that is paid the operator or lessee under the working lease 
thereunder” under the statute.” 
 _____ On its face, the Hales case therefore appears to say that Act 222 says what it means and 
means what it says - the lessee pays royalty based on what the lessee puts in his pocket at the end of 
the day. 
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 _____ How you apply Hillard and Hales to classic post production expenses is anyone’s guess. 
Hillard seems to stand for the proposition that contract language may defeat Act 222. Hales, on the 
other hand, appears to say that Act 222 is to be given affect literally, i.e., that every oil and gas lease 
is to be read as if the statutes were part and parcel of the lease. 
D. Conclusion 
There is a reason the title of this paper is “I Don’t Care What the Rule is, Just Tell me What 
it is.” As far as this author is concerned, Arkansas has no rule, or perhaps more accurately has every 
rule. Unfortunately, the most likely outcome is that Arkansas will continue to meander through the 
post production wilderness making up the rules as it goes along, without ever providing any clear 
cut guidance as to what the rule is. For the moment, however, the most logical approach is to 
assume that Act 222 governs (lessees are required to treat the royalty owners the same way they 
treat themselves), but at the same time recognizing that the parties have the ability to enter into a 
contract (the language of the oil and gas lease) which mandates a result contrary to the dictates of 
Act 222. 
Robert M. Honea • 
Hardin, Jesson & Terry, PLC 
on point, but rarely discussed, may leave him considering a different legal specialty. 
Although Hanna and Clear Creek both discussed compression or transportation costs, the Hillard 
and Hales cases touch on the typical gas purchase contract. 
1 ------ Hillard 
If Arkansas has adopted an at the well aproach, it is most recognizable in Hillard v.- 
Stephens.42—The Hillard case involved a gas purchase contract between Stephens Production 
Company and Ark La.—That contract provided that .......... FINISH FACTS HERE. MENTION 
STATUTE AND IDEA IT “TRANSFORMS” FIXED PRICE LEASES INTO PROCEEDS 
LEASES (theory which court rejects). 
 -------- In Hillard, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the “contract price” that lessess 
received via gas purchase contracts was the “prevailing market price at the well.”—This 
interpretation prohibited the lessors from gaining any excess royalty based on the gas purchase 
contract price.—In true slight of hand, Hillard adopted an at the well approach without ever 
explicitly mentioning it. 
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Hales 
 -------- While Hillard adopted an at the well approach, another case decided in 2000 seems to 
adopt a First Marketable Product approach.—In SEECO, Inc. v. Hales the Arkansas Supreme Court 
considered whether the statute mentioned above had any impact on take or pay contracts. The 
Arkansas Supreme Court discussed the lessee’s implied duty to market, and reasoned that 
XXXXXX. 
 -------- 3 ------- Statute? 
- Section 15 74 703 
All purchasers of oil and gas shall pay to the royalty interest the same premium or bonus above the 
posted market price for oil or gas they pay to the leaseholder or working interest under any oil, gas, 
or mineral lease on lands from which oil or gas may be purchased under contract with the least 
owner or operator. 
 -------- What does this mean??? 
C ------ Reconciling Hanna with Hillard and Hales 
 -------- Hanna seems to be speak definitely on the issue of post production expenses, and alas 
many scholars have been duped by this seemingly straightforward holding.—But, what out of state 
practitioners and scholars do not realize is that Hanna merely a means to an end. When read in the 
context of the Hillard and Hales cases, it becomes clear that Hanna is a backdoor attempt to allow 
judicial interpretation and construction of every oil and gas lease rather than setting forth broad, 
sweeping rules or, worse, broad prospective legislation that could transform only leases written after 
the effective date of the statute. What Hanna does is offer the Court a tool—a tool that allows the 
Court to switch seamlessly between the irreconcilable Hillard and Hales opinions. It also leaves 
open the door for the applicable statute to be used in the context of post production expenses, 
although that has not been clearly tested by our Courts as of the date of this paper. 
1 See Wheeler, Brain S., Deducting Post-production Costs when Calculating Royalty: What does the Lease Provide? 8 
Appalachian J.L. 1, 8 (Winter 2008). 
2 571 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Tex. 1983). 
3 Explain "at the well” as a term of art 
4 CITE 
5 CITE 
6 Explain implied duty to market 
7 CITE 
8 92 So.3d 1141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2012). 
9 499 So.2d 210 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1986). 
10 214 Ca. App.3d 533 (Ct. App. Cal. 2d Dist. 1989). 
19 
 
Id. at 540 (quoting Stats. 1955, ch. 1724 § 7, Historical Note, West's Ann. Pub. Resources Code § 6827). 
12 Id. at 541 (citing Piney Woods Country Life Sch. V. Shell Oil Co. (5th Cir. 1984). 
13 Id. at 541. 
14 2012 WL 3711550, __ P.3d __ (N.M. Aug. 24, 2012). 
15 Id. at *5. 
16 Id. at 8 (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1325 (9th ed. 2009)). 
17 565 N.W.2d 887, 223 Mich. App. 176 (Mich. App. 1997). 
18 Id. at 891, 223 Mich. App. at 182-83. 
19 Id. 
20 112 P. 965 (Okla. 1910). 
21 CITE 
22 8 54 P.2d 880 (1992). 
23 Id. at 881 (citing Johnson v. Jernigan, 475 P.2d 396 (Okla. 1970)). 
24 29 P.3d 887 (Colo. 2001). 
25 Explain "in kind" 
26 886 P.2d 652 (1994). 
27  
28 CITE 
29 CITE STRING CITE THAT REAFFIRMS GARMAN 
30 2 5 7 Kan. 315, 894 P.2d 788 (1995). 
31 5 5 7 S.E.2d 254 (W.Va. 2001). 
32 Wheeler, supra, at 22. 
33 58 P.S. § 33. 
34 Id. at 429 (citing Bibikos, George A. & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus Shale States, 4 Tex. J. 
Oil, Gas & Energy L. 155, 168-69 (2008-2009). 
35 29 A.3d 307 (2012). 
35 See Wheeler, supra, at 10. 
36 Hanna 
37 2 9 7 Ark. 80, 759 S.W.2d 563 (1988). 
38 1 65 Ark. 303, 264 S.W. 830 (1924). 
39 Id. 
40 Hillard v. Stephens, 276 Ark. 545, 637 SW. 2d. 581 (1982) 
41 SEECO v. Hales, 341 Ark. 673, 22 SW. 3d. 157 (2000) 
42 276 Ark. 545, 637 S.W.2d 581 (1982). 
